Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

6-1-1980

The Resource Allocation Problem in Research and Development
Brian D. Wright

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Wright, Brian D., "The Resource Allocation Problem in Research and Development" (1980). Discussion
Papers. 361.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/361

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 353

THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM IN RESEARCH AND DEVELQPMENT

June 1980

Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to
stimulate discussion and critical co~ent. References in publications
to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the author to protect the
tentative character of these papers.

THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT*

Without some kind of government intervention, a competitive market
does not produce sufficient inventions and innovations.

The reason is

that except in some cases where secrets can be protected without legal
support, the producer of new ideas and processes receives an insufficient
reward for his efforts in such a market.

Not only was this problem

understood by policy-makers long before economists were around to write
about. public goods, but the modern solutions had been located before
the aid of my profession could be invoked.
Among these solutions, the patent system has attracted the most
interest on the part of economists.

However a large literature on the

subject (see the survey by Machlup 1958) has added little that is use
ful as a guide to policy.

On the one hand the essentially agnostic

conclusions of Machlup are by his own admission hardly the stuff
on which policy shifts are based.

The detailed investigation of

Nordhaus (1969), on the other, resulted in a general endorsement of
the system, while contributing an additional analytical justification
for the widespread standard patent life limitations of around fourteen
or seventeen years as a minor improvement in the effectiveness of the
system, relative to an infinite patent life.

And the analysis of patents

in non-competitive environments has been predominantly descriptive rather
than presariptive, and inevitably plagued by lack of generality.

{See

Kamien and Schwartz 1975 for an excellent survey.)

*This paper is being prepared for inclusion in a

book, Research
and Development Policy, edited by George Tolley. I would like to thank
with the usual caveat, Cindy Arfken, Martin Baily, Steven Englander,
Robert Evenson, Richard Levin, Richard Nelson, John Quigley, and Marguerite
Alejandro-Wright for assistance of various kinds.
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In this paper I present a new view of the problem of resource al
location which connects the old obsession , the tradeoff between the
excess burden of patents and the appropria bility which they confer, with
other sources of market failure which have attracted increased attention
in the past decade.

This new analysis shows the resource allocatio n

problem to be much more serious and less tractable than has been
tradition ally believed.

Only by charting some of the dimension s of

the problem in this way, can we hope to move towards policy adjustmen ts
which will enable research and developme nt to make the fullest possible
contribut ion to the processes of growth and of adjustmen t to rapid
changes in resource prices.
The paper is organized as follows:

After making necessary dis

tinctions between different types of invention s and innovatio ns in
Section I, I present a very simple research model in Section II.

This

is used to contrast the old economics of patents, outlined in Section
III, with the new view of the patent instrumen t, presented in Section IV.
This new approach casts the ancient appreciat ion of the role of dis
closure in a new light (Section V).

Then several alternativ es to the

current patent system are considere d in Section VI, which draws on
some results derived elsewhere (Wright 1979).

The final section con

tains the conclusio ns of this study.
This volume is, very appropria tely, aimed at an interdisc iplinary
audience of engineers and policy-ma kers as well as economist s.

With

this in mind I have tried to make this chapter intelligib le to those
who perhaps have some training in economics , but are currently engaged
in a field other than.econo mic research.
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I.

Four Categories of Inventions and Innovations
Research and development programs aim to produce new useful informa-

tion.

Since the same item of inf;ormation can be used jointly by any nuro-

her of persons without depleting its factual content, its marginal cost
is the cost of communication.
can be divided into

The output of research and development

four categories, related to the possibility of

financing its production through in effect selling it at a price in ex
cess of marginal cost:
Category I:

Included in this group are discoveries like a new

assembly tool, which could be exploited in productive use without divulg
ing its nature, or else patented and sold to others.
Category II:

This category includes inventions like a design

modification to render a product more efficient, which can be copied at
little cost by anyone who wishes to inspect the product in which the
discovery is incorporated.

Appropriation of the benefits of this type

of invention for private gain can be made possible by legal attribution
of rights or by non-competitive "barriers to entry."
Category

In this category are discoveries like a new method

for analyzing petroleum exploration data, which need not be divulged
by attempts to exploit them, but which could not be patented.
inventor

Thus the

can conceivably obtain his reward for the embodied invention

through the free market, but only as long as secrecy is maintained.
Category IV:

1

This contains discoveries which cannot be exploited

by embodiment in a specific process or marketable product.

An example

is the theory of relativity, or, on a more mundane level, many theoret
ical results published in scholarly journals.
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If these four categorie s of invention were always produced by
separate and distinct processes , the advantage s

of direct governmen t

allocatio n of the fourth is rather clear, while the private sector is
equally clearly a feasible candidate for allocatin g the first.

The

second category can also be allocated "privatel y," but the necessary
role of governmen t extends beyond the "normal" legal protectio ns ac
corded to decentral ized productio n.
Thus the governme ntal role in private research and developme nt most
generally takes the form of public attributio n and enforceme nt of ex
ploitatio n rights to private persons.

Paten-ts in essential ly modern

form antedate the beginning s of modern economics .

The economic analysis

of optimum research and developme nt incentive s is dominated by the study
of patents, which seem to hold a special fascinatio n for our profession.
Section Ill below is devoted entirely to patents because, despite the
mass of economic research which has been devoted to their study, no
adequatel y clear and comprehen sive analysis of their general economic
effects is available .

But this paper considers patents as just one of

several means of optimizin g research and developme nt.

To accomodat e

treatment of this wider set of means of controllin g research in the
confines of this paper, I restrict my attention to the starkly sim
plistic invention model outlined in Section II, which fortunate ly in
corporate s at least some of the character istics which determine the
relative efficienc y of research and developme nt activity in different
allocativ e systems.
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II. A Simple Research Model
The purposes of this study are served by a very simple model of
research toward a well-defined goal.

This goal is discrete, and one

might think of it as knowledge of a new technique which, on discovery,
reduces the marginal cost of production of some non-public good from
MC

0

to MC , as in Figure 1.
1

One can think of this new technique as,

for example, a more efficient means of energy extraction or conversion,
which lowers the cost of the energy produced.
output (energy) is

The demand curve for the

AR, the marginal revenue curve is

MR.

Imagine initially that the new discovery is a category II invention
as defined above.

Research imparts no know~edge which could be used for

any other purposes, including further research.

To simplify the exposi

tion, I rule out distributional considerations by assuming all consumers
are identical.

If the cost-reducing information is discovered and freely

available, its social value is the increase in consumer surplus,
.
d
approximate

equal to

2 b
y the area

B dollars.

P ABP
0
1

in Figure 1, which is defined as

Though these benefits occur over time, the analy-

sis presented below loses little of importance and gains considerably
in simplicity by assuming that

B accrues in a single period.

The total amount of research effort is comprised of

m units of

research activity supplied by competitive researchers who are of similar
ability and, in common with society at large, assumed to be risk-neutral.
The cost of research

C(m)

and the probability that at least one re-
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$

AR

MR

0

Output

Figure 1
The Welfare Cost of a "Run-.of-the-Mi ll"
Patent Caused by Restriction of Use
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searcher will succeed
tiable with

P(m)

C'(m) > 0 , C"(m) > 0 , P'(m) > O , P"(m) < 0 •

benefits of research are
(1)

are assumed to be continuous and twice-differen
The expected

R(m) , where

R(m) - BP(m)

The optimal allocation of resources to research in a model of this type
is illustrated as
(2)

R'(m*)

m* in Figure 2, where

= B.P'(m*) = C'(m*)

,

and the expected net social benefit is equal to the distance

AF.

III. The Old Economics of Patents
There is only one problem with the above scenario.

All the econ

omic benefits are passed on to the users of the product (e.g. energy)
and none are reaped by the producer of the invention which made the

imum economic benefit on society, but not many inventions are likely to
occur without some specific encouragement, if the process of invention
requires scarce resources as inputs.
This problem can be solved by the acquisition of an exclusive patent
which enables the discoverer to appropriate most of the social benefit

B.

The holder of an unlimited patent maximizes profits by limiting use of
the discovery to production of
represented in Figure 1 by area

OQ

0

units of the good.

3

Profits are then

P AcP • This is the entire net social benefit of
0
1
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Figure 2
The Resource Allocation Problem in the
Competitive Search for Inventions
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the invention under the patent system, since price remains at

P
0

and

consumers are no better off than if the invention had not occurred.
Therefore the invention has less social value if it is exploited by a
patent holder than if it is freely available for use, the differenc e
being represent ed by

L

= area

P ABP - area P AcP = area ABC.
0
1
0
1
called the "excess burden" or ''welfare cost" of the patent.

L

is

In practice patent lives are limited, in the United States to
seventeen years.

Although Posner (1977, pp. 54-55) suggests that a

life limitatio n is essential for administr ative reasons, an alternative rationale has been developed by Nordhaus (1969).

The essential s

of his analysis are represent ed in Figure 3, using the simple model
developed above.

(Linearity of

C'(m)

to make the diagram easier to draw.)
is freely available is

*
m,

and

P'(m)

is assumed in order

The social optimum when knowledge

as in Figure 2.

According to this analy-

sis, under an unlimited patent the equilibriu m research effort is

m ,
1

where
(3)

w-nen the patent life is limited to

T years, the present value of

profits and excess burden are both reduced proportio nately by a mul
tiplicativ e factor

a.

Assuming the annual returns would have been

constant forever,
T

(4)

a(T, r) = 1 -

J e-rtdt
0

where

r

is the rate of interest.

patent, given
curring at

0

The equilibriu m under the finite-li fe

a(T, r), can be represent ed in our atemporal model as oc-

m , where
2

-10-

G

A
D

L

......

C' (m)
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I
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(B-L)P 1 (m)
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Research Activity
m,
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.l.

Figure 3
The Old Economics of Patents:
Determination of Patent Life

'1

(m)
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(S)

The marginal social value of research, given a , is (B - (1 - a)L)P'(m) •
This is the equation for the straight line through A and Bin Figure 3.
0

The difference between the social value of the patent with a life of T
years and the social value of the infinite patent is represented in
Figure 3 as the difference between area
L

is positive, as

a

increases from

ABCD

and area

O (i.e. as

CEF.

Assuming

T decreases from

infinity) this difference is initially positive, and a maximum occurs
at some life

T* where the increase in area of triangle

the increase in area

CEF

ABCD.

The magnitude of the potential returns from reduction of
finity is limited to some fraction of
of the gross expected benefits at
the ratio of area

equals

ABC

to area

T

from in

P(m ).L , which is itself a fraction
1

m , P(m ).B.
1
1
P AcP •
0
1

In Figure 1

L/B

equals

More generally, the following

approximation holds:
( 6)

L/B

:t ½ dP.dQ
dP.Q
,

=

Thus the value of

~

L/B

D dP

n -p

for a category II (cost-reducing) invention

depends upon the elasticity of demand

nD

for the product which has its

production cost lowered, as well as on the degree of cost reduction

dP •

To take an example considered typical of run-of-the-mill inventions by
Nordhaus (1969, p. 81), if the demand elasticity is minus one, and the
cost reduction is five percent,
gain from adjusting

L/B

equals 0.025. Hence the potential

T is typically a small percentage of the gross

expected benefits of research.
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The relation between patent life and the social value of the patent,
under the old view of patents, is illustra ted for several cases in Figure
4.

Cases IA and IB show the relation between net expected social gain

from inventio n and the life of the patent using the example illustra ted
4

in Figure 3 , with r

= 0.15 and values of L/B of 0 and 0.1 respecti vely,

the latter being chosen as a relative ly "high" value for
that the optimal patent life
ity for

L/B

23 years.)

T

*

is 17 years for

L/B

L/B = 0.1

.

Note

but infin-

= O. (For L/B = 0.025 (not illustra ted) the optimal life is
Cases IIA and IIB illustra te the relation when the (constan t)

margina l cost of research is fifty percent higher than in the previous
example , for

t = 0 and L = 0.1 respecti vely.5 This case represen ts a

line of research of lower expected product ivity.6 Optimal patent life for
L = 0.1 is 23 years.
Though optimal patent life is sensitiv e to

L/B

in both cases

shown, cases IA through IIB show that social welfare is remarkab ly in
sensitiv e to

T

over a large range.

Other examples yield similar results .

(See Nordhaus (1969, p. 84) for an examina tion of numerous paramet er com
bination s in a similar model.)
These results imply that choosing a statutor y patent life is a rela
tively simple problem . Because precisio n in choice of

T

is unimpor tant,

a standard statutor y life can be chosen for all patents without signific ant
diminut ion of the expected social value of each inventio n.

The adminis 

trative economy (if not absolute neces;it y) of such a broad rule is
obvious to anyone remotely familiar with the patentin g process .

the loss function for errors in

Further ,

T has a happy assymet ry--larg e losses

can occur only if a fairly short patent life is chosen.
Thus the prescrip tion of this --analysi s is straight forward .

The

fixed patent lives of seventee n years in the USA (and fourteen in the

Percent of
Maximum Social
Value Under
Old Analysis
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Figure 4
The Effect of Patent ll.:Lfe on the Social Value of Research: The Old Patent Economics

-14United Kingdom and many other countries) are both quite acceptable, since
they both come close to maximizing the social value of competitive
research processes over a wide range of the relevant parameters.

The

above analysis obviously indicates that the standardization of patent
lives, which brings enormous administrative benefits, comes at negligible
cost.

Further, attempts to determine the optimum standardized life ap

pear unlikely to be worth the effort involved.

But we shall see in

Section N that the above analysis, and its unusually happy public
policy implications, are unfortunately incorrect.

IV. The "Fishing Problem" and the New Economics of Patents
The old economics of patents assumes that the production of inven
tions is like other productive activities which use private inputs
under competitive profit maximization.

But using the model developed

above, it is easy to show that this is not the case.

Since all of the

competitive researchers are equally proficient in this model, each has
an equal chance of success.

Hence each will perceive his marginal and

average return for each unit of effort (each "ticket" in the "invention
lottery") as

, the expected average return.

m

The researchers,

being rational profit-maximiz ers, will set marginal cost equal to this
expected return .
(7)

C'(m) = (B-L)P(m)
m

In Figure 2 , this equilibrium occurs at
equals the slope of

the ray

OG.

me, where the slope of C'{m)

Net social benefit is

construction less than the optimal net social benefit, AF.
total cost curve

C(m)

HD, which is by
If the

were linear (i.e. if research effort were

-15-

supplied at constant cost) it is easy to see that research would yield
no net social benefit at all under this scheme!
This misallocation, which was noted by Usher (1964) is similar to
the problem of over-exploitation of an unregulated fishery (Gordon 1954),
which is why I have called it the "fishing problem."

It is also akin to

what is understood in the popular literature as the "tragedy of the
commons" (Hardin 1968), and to other "rent-seeking behavior" (Krueger
19?4).

The dissipation of the benefits of research by competitive

-production of inventions before the socially optimal time (Barzel 1968, Kitti
1973) is a dynamic intertemporal version of the same type of market failure.
Attention to this type of resource misallocation may have been
reduced by empirical evidence showing private rates of return

to re-

search and development in the 1950's and 1960's of thirty percent or more.
But a recent study (Pakes and Shankerman 1979) concludes that the private
return on research and development is only between three and five percent higher than the return on other capital.
ential as a modest risk premium.

They explain t~is differ

The contrast with earlier results

arises mainly from their estimate of at least 18 percent for the
depreciation rate of the private value of a discovery.

Previous studies

assumed that the depreciation rate was equal to the much lower rate of
decay of physical productivity of other capital.

Though Pakes and

Shankerman attribute the low rate of return to the increasing difficulty of preventing appropriation of inventions by competitors, the
model presented here shows why one might expect their result regardless
of the significance of that problem.
There are two ways of correcting the misallocation of research re
sources in the model developed above.

The first (and less practical)

solution is to change the rules so that the patent is awarded only when

7
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just one successful outcome is achieved for only then is the successful
effort marginally productive.

If several researchers discover the same

discrete objective considered here, the marginal social value of each
of their efforts is zero.

In this static context, all researchers would

submit their results to the

competition should

~atent Office;

prevent collaboration between researchers to mask multiple successes,
since verification would require communication of the result with no
guarantee that the receiving party has really made the same discovery. 8
In the real world, this system might be much more difficult to
administer than for example the current patent system, which is itself
perceived by some legal authorities as being in serious trouble due to
the cost and inefficiency of legal enforcement.

In continuous time,

distinguishing independent achievements from copying, and preventing
collusive behavior, might prove to be insurmountable difficulties.
Because of these questions about its administrative feasibility, this
alternative is not considered further here, though market incentives
awarded under this criterion otherwise dominate conventional patents,
as shown in the more technical discussion presented in Wright (1979).

A second method of correcting this problem is to reduce the award
sufficiently to obtain the optimal resource allocation
necessary reduction factor is a fraction
with respect to
(8)

a0

a

0

m*

The

, the elasticity of

P(m)

m:

•

h(P(m)) _

mP'(m)
P(m)

In Figure 2 the value of the patent should be reduced by a fraction
(B ** - C ~(B - C)
o
O
O
0

of the value of the discovery.

If several research-

ers are successful, this reduced reward is bestowed randomly to one of
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them or is shared by all.
tion

In practice this would be achieved by limita

of patent life, which is usually justified by economists (e.g.

Nordhaus 1969, Scherer 1972; but see Kitti 1973 for a notable exception)
only as a means of achieving an optimal tradeoff between the excess
burden of the patent restriction and the supposed advantages of awarding
successful researchers the full social value of a discovery, as discus
sed above.
The relation between patent life and the social contribution of
research and development, according to this new view of the patent incen
tive, is illustrated in Figure 5, where Cases IA through IIB illustrate
the same cases used in Figure 4.
with

L

in this case,• in contrast to the old patent economics analysis

of Figure 4.

Clearly the patent welfare cost

cance for the optimal patent life
But the level of
crucial

Note that optimal patent life increases

T*

L

has much less signifi

in this figure than in Figure 4.

L/B , and the length of patent life are both much more

for patent system efficiency than suggested in that figure.

In contrast to Figure 4, large losses can result when too long a
p::it"Pnt"

1 i fp

;

s

rhn51:>n.

Fn..-

r::ISP!!:: TA

and IB

j

a patent life

n-F c,,:n,ont-oon

years (as in the U.S.A.) wastes over 60 percent of the maximum expected
net social value!

(If the current practice of providing tax incentives

to research and development through expensing of capital inputs were
also taken into account, the discrepancy would be even greater.)
IB, the loss incurred at optimally adjusted

T

For case

due to the welfare cost

L

of the patent system, which has been the focus of much of the literature,
is much smaller than the loss caused by a seventeen year patent life - it
represents only about 30 percent of the net social value of research.
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number cannot be read from the figure, because of the proportiona l scaling
of the vertical axis.)

For case IIB, on the other hand, a seventeen year

life limit is almost optimal, whereas the welfare cost of

L/B = 0.1

causes a 55 percent loss in the (lower) potential social value of research
in this higher-cost case.
Although
estimation of

T

is less sensitive to

a large error in

T.

than in Figure 4, accurate

L i s ~ important in this new analysis.

mistakenly assuming that

research.

L/B

L/B

in Figure 4,

equals zero when it is really

0.1

means

T, but a trivial loss in potential social benefit of

In Figure 5, the same mistake means a much smaller error in

But an error of only a few years in either direction in choosing

T

can destroy a large portion of the expected net social value of the in
vention process.

If the optimal

T

is chosen using Case IIA, when

Case IIB should be used, over 40 percent of the maximum social value is
lost.
Most serious of all, the efficiency of a given choice of
very sensitive to the parameters of the invention model.

If

T
T

is also

is chosen

with Case II in mind, the greater part of the potential social value
expected from the invention process is lost if costs have been over
estimated by 50 percent, for then Case I applies.

If the reverse mistake

is made, all of the potential contributio n of the invention process is
wasted, since no research takes place.
For a given success function

P(m),

the sensitivity of the expected

social benefit to patent life is highest when the supply elasticity of research
effort is infinite, as in the above examples.

For example, if Case I

is altered so that the supply curve is unit elastic (i.e. a straight line
through O and Hin Figure 3) then the relation between patent life and

-20-

expected social benefit is shown, for a "typical"
Figure 6.

L/B = 0.025 , in

This case, denoted Case III, looks much more like the relation

derived for C.ases I and II using the old patent economics in Figure 4, and
accuracy in the choice of patent life is less crucial than for Case I and
II.
The three cases examined are sufficient to show that if research
supply is elastic, the cost of a uniform patent life is much greater than
the old patent economics indicated.

Even though Cases I and II differ only

in the level of costs, a standard patent life to cover both would waste
at least twenty percent of the expected benefits of one or the other.
More extreme examples would only reinforce the conclusion that the ad
ministrative advantage of a uniform-life patent system is a potentially
costly convenience.
Of course if the relevant parameters were

known to the Patent

Office, individual optimal patent lives would be tailor-made for each
definable area of research.
the achievable welfare for

If the optimal lives were correctly calculated,
L

>

0

could conceivably be higher than in the

conventional analysis outlined in the previous section.

For example, the

optimum for Case IIB illustrated in Figure 5 yields a net expected welA ·
fare gain nearly ten percent higher than the maximum gain reported for
Case IIB in Figure 4.

Hence given that patents were the chosen means of

encouraging research, the "fishing problem" would arguably be a (small)
blessing if all pertinent information were freely available and admin
istration were costless.

But would any kind of patent system be the

best means of encouraging research under these conditions?
to this question below.

I will return

Percent of
Maximum Value
Under
Old Analysis
100

_/

.....

··--~

/
//'

-----

III

/

--

..........

__________________

80

60

40

20

·- - ... - -----

0
10

-- . ·------

... --1

· • - - - - - -....... · - - - ..- - - - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

20

30

40

Patent Life (years)
Figure 6
The Effect of Patent Life When Sunnlv Is Unit Elasti~
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V.

A Re-evaluation of the Role of Disclosure
The above analysis of the existing patent system ref~rs exclusively

to Category II inventions.

But the system does not appear to have

been adopted with inventions of this type in mind.

Rather,the classical

analysis of patents implicitly assumes that most discoveries are a composite of
Category 111 with Category II and/or Category I inventior.s.

Discovery of a

specific process or product (a Category I or II inventor) is often accompanied
by information about the prospects for similar lines of investigation (a
Category III discovery).

When a patent is awarded, the value of the Category

II or Category I element of the discovery is (in the "run-of-the-mi ll" case
see above) awarded to the inventor under government protection.

But the

Category III element of the discovery may be made freely available to all
others by the description of the invention, filed for public inspection, from
,,;1:ich the patent system derives its name.

Tradition.::i.lly defenders of

patents have stressed this role of the patent system as a means of dis
closure, given that a discovery has been made, whereas I have up to now
concentrated on its role in the allocation of research resources.
when the "fishing problem" is taken into account, these two
roles of the patent system can be highly complementary.

Disclosure of

the Cetegory III element of the discovery means that the holder of a
patent does not receive all of the social benefits of his discovery.
But in

order

to prevent over-allocation of resources to research

some reductions in the realized benefits is generally desirable, as the examples
given in Section IV sholo:ed.

If, as is likely to be the case, the optima.I

reduction is greater than that effected by the seventeen-year patent
life limitation, then~ loss of patent value through disclosure
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would be socially beneficial because of its effects on the allocation
of research resources. 9
Of course the required reduction varies with the relevant parm~eters
of the research model;

there is no reason to expect that disclosure

leads to the optir:1c,l adj ustnent of research benefits discussed below in
Section

VI.

However if the supply curve of research is horizontal for

all positive levels of research, disclosure will always improve the
allocation of research resources relative to patents without disclosure,
since in the latter case expected net social benefits are zero.

More

generally,if supply has positive elasticity,~ degree of disclosure
is always beneficial.
Before concluding this discussion of disclosure, I should point
out that though I have recognized administrative constraints in this
section by assuming that all patents have a standard length of life,
the characterization of the patent system remains rather idealized.

In

existing patent systems, protection of Category I and II inventions is
incomplete, because litigation to prevent violations is costly, and com
petitors can often "invent around" a patent, reducing its value.

On the

other hand the disclosure provisions are also imperfect--in fact some
writers argue that they have little practical value (see Kitch 1977).
Though these qualifications must be recognized no evaluation of their
importance will be attempted here.
Despite the possible positive contribution of the disclosure
function, a patent system with fixed patent life cannot be expected
to be nearly as efficient as the old economics of patents had indicated.
In the next section, I consider the relative merits of possible alterna
tives to the current patent system.
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VI.

Alter nativ es to the Curre nt Paten t Syste m
A.

Choic es Requ iring Grea ter Adm inistr ative Cont rol

In Secti on IV I noted that if paten t life can be "tailo
r-ma de" at
no cost for each type of resea rch proce ss, and if
all relev ant infor ma
tion were freel y avail able, then the socia l value
of resea rch under
paten ts migh t be much highe r than under the curre
nt syste m.

But under

these cond ition s the paten t is clear ly a non-o ptima
l choic e. For exam ple,
direc t contr ol throu gh publi c resea rch agen cies,
or by contr acts to
priva te indiv idua ls, could ensur e perfo rman ce of
resea rch tasks iden tical
to those which would have taken place under paten
ts, but finan ced from
tax reven ues, presu mabl y at a lower welfa re cost
than the welfa re cost
10
L of the paten t restr ictio n.
To justi fy choic e of paten ts over all other meas
ures, it is neces sary
to chang e one of the assum ption s of the mode l. Cons
ider the case where
admi nistr ation is

costl ess but the publi c autho rity in contr ol of re-

searc h does not have all the infor matio n avail able
to (all) resea rcher s_
abou t the param eters of the resea rch proce ss.

Dire ct acqu isitio n of the

resea rcher s' infor matio n by the publi c autho rity
is ruled out as too
costl y, or just down right infea sible . An infor matio
nal imba lance be~
tween resea rcher s and the gover nmen t autho rity is
incor porat ed in the
equa tions for the cost of resea rch and the bene fits
of inven tions as
follo ws:
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C (m).

(9)

= (1

+

e) C(~) ,

and

B = B(l

(10)

e

where

r;

and

+ ,;)

are random shifters and

(11)

For

the welfare cost

now

L of the patent restriction , and the

welfare costs of financing contracts, are assumed away.
This is a two-period model.

In period 1 the government authority

must choose the means it will use to encourage research,kno wing
er

2

but not

'

6

.; ,

and

0

2

8

and

and researchers make their production commit8

ments, given their knowledge of the relevant v6lues of

and

,; •

The

simple rational expectation s assumption is made that all parties know
the equations of the model (Muth 1961), and all are assumed risk-neutra l.
Consider the simple case where
P(,;

0

)

= P(-,;

0

)

e

=

0

and

,; = ~,;

0

,

with probabiliti es

Then the expected value of the patent instrument,

= 0.5.

relative to a direct central allocation of research, is illustrated in
Since the government authority does not know

Figure 7.

it can do is to set

m equal to

m0

units of research.

l.; =

+,;

0

,

m
0

by, for example, contracting for

If there were no"fishing problem", then when

the new equilibrium value of

would be at

,; , the best

m under (infinite-l ife) patents

In this case the value of the added flexibility of

the patent system is the increased economic surplus represented by area
GHE , relative to the contractual allocation of

Similarly when
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$

C' (m)

0

a (1+, )B.P(m)/rn
0

0

a (1-r,; )B.P(m) /m
0

0

(l-r,; )n. P '(m)

0

Research Activity (m)

Figure 7
The Social Value of Research Under Patents Relative to Prizes
or Contracts When Researchers Have Exclusive Information about
Discovery Value
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l,;

=

0
-l,;

,

the equilibrium level of research in

m2 , and the differential

value of the patent system is represented by the area

Since both

EFB.

areas represent gains, if there were no "fishing problem" and if

L were

zero, because of its informational advantages patents would always dominate contracts for Category I and Category II inventions.

(1)

11

Variable-Life Patents
But in a competitive model the "fishing problem" does exist.

the correction factor

a

incentive (1 + ,;) B!(m)

= h(P) -

0

is applied to the perceived

(through "tailor-made" patent life limitation

in a multi-period model) then equilibrium occurs at either
Figure 7.

At

l,;

=

0
+l,;

represented by area
expected benefits.

,

m
3

or

m
4

HJK, the increase in costs net of the increase in
Similarly if

the relative slopes of

l,;

=

0
-l,;

,

C;(m )
O

the reduction in expected
ABD.

Depending on

and B.P;(m ) , the loss areas
O

might completely exceed the gain areas

GHE

and

HJK

BEF.

and

If that

happens then contracts are the superior instrument for getting the re
search done.
The case where

and

l,; = 0

is illustrated in Figure

8.

0

+

= -0

0

, with

0

0

P(0) = P(-6) = 0.5,

The expected net gain from the patent

system relative to the contract alternative is represented by half of
the sum of areas

FHG

in

the reduction in social benefit from the patent is

net social benefit of the patent is shown in area

ABD

If

and

EFB

minus half the sum of areas

HJK

and
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$

(l+O) C' (m)

(1-0)C' (m)

a n.P(m)/m
0

p' (m)
0
m
0

Research Activity (m)

Figure 8
The Social Value of Patents or Prizes Relative to, Contracts
When Researchers Have Exclusive Cost Infonnation
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ABD •

r;

More generally, assume

and

6

are independent and have "com

pact" distributions (Samuelson 1970), and have "small" variances
and

If contracts can be financed with negligible excess burden,

the expected net difference between the social value of using patents
and the social value of contracts is approximately (see Appendix):

E[D ]

(12)

1

F

= m C' (m )
0

.!.

0

Ln

<~>2
B

+

where

n

or;+ 0 6
2
2 ~[
+ 1 - h(P), l

1
2 [- - h(MP)]
n

J

L
B

7

J

1

n
1

h(MP)

2(- + 1 - h(P))

n

}

is the elasticity of supply of research inputs and

h(MP)

the elasticity of marginal probability of success with respect to

is
m.

This expression is, in the absence of further restrictions, of ambiguous
sign, even if

L equals zero.

Thus more sophisticated, variable-life

patents are not necessarily better than contracts, in this model.

(2)

Prizes
By assumption the entire welfare cost

L

can be avoided if the

government authority offers prizes instead of patents--but the cost is
that information on

,

is lost, since the reward for success is set

by the central authority.

The expected net difference in social welfare

from using prizes rather than contracts is derived analogously to (12):
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(13)

= m C' (m )
0

0

{[

The sign of this expressio n is also in general ambiguous .
ministrat ion is costless, it is necessary to know

L/B ,

0

2

6

and

Thus if ad

h(MP) , h(P) , n ,

to optimally choose between patents, prizes and contracts .

Since none of these parameter s is very easy to observe, the choice of
the best means of controllin g research is no simple task in this con
text.

Actually the superiori ty of direct control (i.e. contracts ) over

the other options can be determine d from just the three elasticit ies
h(l1P) , h(P)

and

n•

12
But estimatio n of these elasticit ies appears to

be a real challenge , given the present state of data on research and
developm ent.

Perhaps close cooperati on between economist s and those

directly involved in research and developme nt could help generate the
data needed to inform our intuition about these parameter s, at least
for some of the better-un derstood types of research processes .
In the absence of such informati on, I must resort to a rather
arbitrari ly .specified functiona l form for

P(m)

to provide an example

of the optimal choice between the three instrumen ts.

If each of

units of research effort can be expended on a subset of

m

n > m possible

research possibili ties, each with the same probabili ty of success

~ , and

if each researche r knows which of these are being pursued by others, then

(14)

P(m) = 1 - (1 - ~)

m
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In this case the optimal choice between patents, prizes (both limited in
value to eliminate the fishing problem) and contracts can be determined
from Table 1 (see Wright (1979) p. 24 and Table 2). As the table shows,
prizes are most attractive when the elasticity of supply of research, n ,
and the probability of success

P(m) , are both low.
0

Contracts are best

when the elasticity of supply is very high, and a high probability of
success also favors contracts.

For a plausible value of

L/B/cr~ like

0.025, patents are best only for the cluster of entries at the middle of
t

~

top of the table.
Other forms of the function

results.

P(m)

will give somewhat different

Host of the reasonable alternative specifications which come

easily to mind would probably imply a smaller range of dominance for
patents.

For example, if the number of promising research alternatives

is rather small, and duplication of research is more likely the divergence
between marginal and average rewards which lies at the heart of the
ufishing problem" might be much greater than in the above example, in
which case the relative attractiveness of contracts

or other means of

direct central control would be greater.

B.
(3)

Choices Requiring Less Administrative Attention

Secrecy
The set of feasible alternatives for controlling research activity

depends on the administrative capacity of the system and on the nature
of the anticipated discoveries.

If any system requiring a greater degree

of public involvement (legal and bureaucratic) than the current system
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Table 1
Choosing the Best Invention Incentive (Ignoring Administrative
Costs): Critical Valuesa of (L/B)/o 2
l;

Elasticity of Supply of Research
Probability that
Success Is Achieyeda

.1

.5

1

2

10

.1

o.o5b

0.24

0.45

0.82

2.11

.3

0.05

0.21

0.36

0.56

0.55

.6

0.05

0.16

0.22

0.23

.9

0.04

0.08

0.03

aThe probability that at least one research effort will be successful is
assumed to be P(m)
timum
b

m

0

, with
2

m

=

1 - (1 - n) , evaluated at the non-stochastic op-

n = 0.01.
·

If (L/B)/ol; exceeds the figure in the table, a prize is best.
the patent system is best.

If not,

A dash indicates cases where the patent and

prize options are inferior to the contract alternative.
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of awarding patents is ruled out as administratively infeasible (or un
acceptably costly, which amounts to the same thing) then the only real
alternative is maintenance of secrecy.
Secrecy has been discussed frequently in the literature, but has
attracted little analytical attention.

Though I shall not attempt a full

economic analysis of the secrecy alternative here, important aspects of
this alternative can be understood within the analytical approach devel
oped above.
Obviously secrecy cannot usefully protect Category II or Category IV in
ventions, which cannot be exploited without revealing the discovery to others.
For other inventions, secrecy implies a welfare cost

L

incurred due to the

profit-maximizing restriction of the use of the knowledge generated, like
the patent welfare cost illustrated in Figure 1 above.

The size of this

cost depends on the duration of the successful defence of the secret, which
depends on the extent of public protection of secrecy, on the private re
sources devoted to attacking and defending secrecy, and on the effective
ness of both kinds of resources.
In

t-he

tt.1n-perinn i.:t-och:u::t-;,.. mnn,:, 1 111-:Pn above, the efficiency of

secrecy probably is bounded by the following alternative cases.

If two

or more can keep (and exploit) a secret as easily as one, then the
"fishing problem" will tend to dissipate the social value of the research
performed, just like a patent with unlimited life.
keep a secret at all,

If two or more cannot

then the secrecy alternative is approximately as

socially valuable as the alternative patent system mentioned above, that
would award a patent only when just one researcher makes a discovery
(This patent system which has been ruled out as infeasible in this paper.)
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Under this assum ption the expect ed advant age of secrec y over
contra cts
can be obtain ed using the same genera l approa ch outlin ed in
the deriva tion
of

E[D ]
1

in the Appendix (see Wrigh t (1979, pp. 12-15 )):

2

= m0 C' (m

(15)

0

(a c;

)
I
L

2

+ ae +

L 2

(B) )

2[1/n - h(MP)]

-L/B]

E[D ] ~ E{D ], secrec y can be social ly attrac tive if "two
3
1
can't keep a secre t," espec ially when the admin istrati ve econom
ies

Since

are taken into accoun t.

Unfor tunate ly I do not posses s the data

necess ary to form a judgme nt on the extent of joint explo itation
of resear ch secret s indepe ndentl y discov ered by differ ent resear
chers.
Since eviden ce of such activi ty might imply crimin al collus ion
in
the United States , it would be surpri sing if it would be easy
to
come by.
unfort unatel y secrec y may exacer bate anothe r source of waste
of
resour ces, namely , duplic ation of resear ch which has alread y
been per
formed by others (see Kitch 1977, p. 276).

Under a patent system , the

public ity of the patent award helps reduce this type of waste,
by inform 
ing poten tial resear chers that certai n lines of invest igatio n
have al
ready been covere d.
Throug hout this discus sion, I have assumed that the poten tial
for
explo iting Catego ry I or III discov eries under secrec y is not
hampe red
by the need for the discov erer to provid e the other comple mentar
y inputs
(or to find a partne r or backer who will keep the secre t).

In practi ce

this may be unrea listic espec ially for small, compe titive resear
ch firms.
To the extent that this is true, the advant ages of secrec y consid
ered in
this sectio n have been overst ated.
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For Category I and Category III inventions, secrecy is always available
as an alternative to the patent system. Reduction of patent lives for the
allocative reasons indicated in Section IV will encourage abandonment of the
patent system in favor of this alternative.

Whether this is a socially

desirable outcome depends on the net effect of the advantages and dis
advantages of secrecy outlined above.
is possible.

It may be that no general answer

If secrecy is viewed as socially undesirable, de.spite

its administrative advantages, a natural conclusion might be that govern
ments should not protect ~orporate secrets. But this apparently obvious con
clusion is not generally correct.

If government protection is withdrawn,

it is reasonable to expect that more inventions will be patented, which
is the desired result.

But it is equally reasonable to expect that

private resources will be devoted to attacking and defending the Category
I secrets which remain, and the Category III discoveries which by defin
ition have no alternative protection besides secrecy.

The desirability

of government protection depends on the net result of these two effects.
The resources expended in this way represent additional costs of secrecy,
which should be taken into account in a more detailed-analysis.

-36-

VII. Conclu sion
The benef its which societ y reaps from resear ch and develo pment
may
well fall far below the theore tical optimum which could be attain
ed with
perfec t public knowle dge of the costs and expect ed benef its of
differ ent re
search activi ties. Econo mists and policy makers have not fully
apprec iated the
magnit ude of this gap betwee n poten tial and perfor mance .

Resear ch and

. develo pment activi ty is subjec t to severa l types of market
failur e.
Though plausi ble soluti ons can be found for each, separa tely,
th-ir inter
action presen ts proble ms which are much more diffic ult to handle
, and
which justif y a full reapp raisal of the curren t set of public
policy in
strume nts for contro lling resear ch and develo pment .
Curren tly paten ts, where feasib le, are the favore d means of en
courag ing resear ch becaus e of the admin istrati ve econom ies and
inform a
tional effici ency associ ated with their relati ve decen traliza
tion.

Their

most widely recogn ized drawba ck, the welfar e cost associ ated
with the
restri ction of use of the patent ed invent ion, is consid ered
to be of
minor signif icance , though it has helped to justif y the limita
tion of
patent life to sevent een years or therea bouts.

Since the social benef its

in the old patent econom ics are remark ably insen sitive to patent
life for
lives above a dozen years or so, the unifor mity of the life
limita tion,
which is such a great admin istrati ve econom y, appear s to come
at a triv
ial welfar e cost.
But accord ing to recent theore tical argum ents, suppo rted by
curren t
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empirical results, such patents should encourage competitive over-alloca
tion of resources for patentable research, unless the unpatentable "spill
over'' associated with discoveries is sufficiently large.

Indeed, if the

supply of research is elastic, this spillover, which is commonly viewed
as a source of resource misallocation, may constitute the major net
economic benefit of the research, a large part of the remainder of the
social benefit being dissipated through wasteful duplication of results
and/or research tasks.

The subsidy implicit in the tax treatment of

research and development may well exacerbate this problem.
It is possible to improve the allocation of research resources by
adjusting patent life.

In this new analysis, the social benefit of

research can be highly sensitive to the accuracy of this adjustment;
a mistake of a few years in either direction can lead to a heavy loss
of new research benefits.

And optimal patent life is a function of

several parameters which are difficult to observe, and of the welfare
cost of the patent restriction.

(In contrast to the old patent econ

omics, optimal patent life is a positive function of the latter.)
Unfortunately much of the gap between current and optimal patent per
formance may remain unless different patent lives were offered for
different areas of research.
Given sufficient information about the relevant parameters, each
area of research could have a different patent life.

But I have shown

that if some information about the costs or rewards of research remains
hidden from the public authority controlling research, direct government
control might be superior to patents.

This is more likely when the supply
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of research effort is elastic.

Paradoxically, high economic responsive

ness can penalize the more decentralized alternative!

And in this

situation the administrative advantages of the current uniform-life
patents would be largely lost. Further, if this type of patent system
were administrativel y feasible, prizes, which are now offered mainly for
nonpatentable discoveries, might be the best type of incentive, especially

if the supply of research effort is inelastic.
Of course the administrative economy of a fixed-life patent system
may well outweigh any theoretical advantages of the above alternatives,
for most types of applied research.

If that is the case, further work

to determine the best patent life, and the optimal tax treatment of re
search and development, certainly appears to be justified.

And the

above analysis has suggested that the alternative of protecting dis
coveries through secrecy, where practicable, might in fact be the
socially desirable alternative in certain situations.
This

appraisal of resource allocation in research and develop

ment should be understood as tentative and even speculative.

Important

facts of life, like risk aversion and monopoly, have been assumed away.
The main point is that getting the greatest net return from this sector
is much more tricky than we have hitherto believed.

In fact it may be

one of the most difficult allocative problems of modern society.

The

problem is clearly important enough to justify further investigation by
economists and others concerned with public policy--encoura ged, presum
ably, by explicit or implicit prizes, and/or research contracts.
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FOOTNOTES

1

Hirsch leifer (1971) points out that the value of inventi ons

could in princip le be approp riated using futures market s.

But the additio nal

gains from specul ation are limited when the discove ry is protect ed
by a
patent or secrecy .

For example under a "run-o f-the mill" patent of the

type conside red below, the discove ry does not cause a change in produc
t
prices , and no opportu nity for additio nal gain through the futures
market
exists .
2

The value of the prospe ctive inventi on is assumed to be small rela

tive to total income; hence the problem of compen sation in econom ic
sur
plus calcula tions can be neglec ted.

(For a rigorou s justifi cation , see

Willig (1976).
3 Only "run-o
f-the-m ill" inventi ons are conside red here.

This means

that cases where optima l exploi tation of the patent right involve s
an in
crease in

Q are exclude d.

Minor cost-re ducing inventi ons will genera lly

be of the run-of -the-m ill type.

(Nordha us (1969) pp. 70-73 provide s a

clear discus sion of the distinc tion between these cases.)
4

and

The actual functio ns are

B = 1

At equilib rium with

elastic ity with respect to
5 rn

C(m) = 0.005 m, P(m) = .Olm - .OOOlm2 ,
L

=

0, the latter curve has unit

m.

Figure 4, curves IA and IIA converg e on the single dotted line

to the top right of the figure.

-40-

6
At

L = 0 , and unlimite d patent life, expected benefits exceed

costs by 1/6 in this case, whereas the equivale nt figure for the previous
case was 1/2.
7se·e
for example Mansf1.·e1d (1965), or Gri·1·i ces
h
(f ort h coming
· ).
8
The interest ed reader can compare this solution to the "Clarke
Tax" proposed as a mechanism for obtainin g honest revelati on of prefer
ences for public goods (Clarke 1971;

Tideman and Tullock 1976); Susan

Rose-Ac kennan drew my attentio n to an analogy between the two schemes .
9
10

This benefit of disclosu re is recogniz ed by Barzel (1968).
rt is of course possible that a sufficie ntly irration al tax scheme

would incur a higher welfare cost than

L ,.but one needs only minimal

confiden ce in the fiscal structur e to rule out this possibi lity.
11
The method of analysis used here is an extensio n of the approach
of Weitzma n (1974).

The materia l in this section follows the more detailed

and compreh ensive treatmen t found in Wright (1979), to which those readers
with a special interes t in this analytic al approach may wish to refer.
12

A sufficie nt conditio n for the inferio rity of contrac ts relative

to prizes depends on just

n

expected margina l cost curve
return curve

BP'(m) , i.e. if

and
C'(m)

h(MP) •

Contrac ts are inferio r if the

is steeper than the expected margina l

n.h(MP) < -1.

This conditio n can be ver

ified by constru cting alternat ive cases similar to that illustra ted in
Figure 8.

It is analogou s to the conditio n derived by Weitzman (1974) in

evaluati ng the simpler choice between price and quantity controls in his
model.
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APPENDIX
The Social Value of a Variable-Life Patent

This patent is awarded to a successful inventor, or shared by all
successful inventors, in period 2.

The fishing problem is avoided by

reducing the value of the patent by a factor

a, (the atemporal version

of the "patent life limitation") announced in period 1.

The analysis

which follows is presented in more detail in Wright (1979) to which the
interested reader is referred.

The cost of research is:

(a.1)
where

C is the cost of research when

optimal allocation if

and

~

m

equals

m

e are fixed at zero.

0

and

e

=

0, the

The social value

of an invention, B , is

B

(a.2)

wi1ere

=

B(l + ~)

D is assumed independent of

m .

The probability that at least

one research effort will suceeed is
(a. 3)

where

p

is the probability of success at

m

0

Assume that there are no administrative costs, and that revenue can
be raised with no excess burden.
equilibrium allocation

m

0

chases at the price

(a.4)

R' (m ) =
0

a

BP
o

m

0

Then in the non-stochastic case, the

can be achieved by direct government pur-
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where
a

(a.5)

0

em

= h(P)

0

p

If the patent instrument is adopted in the stochastic model, and

L
B

is

small, the first order difference in the incentive from (a.4) is

E [a
C

R (m) - R' (m ) ]
O

m

0

=

_B

(I ', p I (m ) _ _p

m

, ,

0

+ a0

o

\ .

BP
m

( '

_ L )

0

Inventors determine

m

B

\l

J

m

0

+

1

BP (Y _ y )

m

0

o

in period 1 based on their knowledge of the

stochastic tenns and the announced value of. a

m = t (?;, e , a) .

(a.7)

The equilibrium change in marginal cost is
E [C 1 (ill)

(a.8)

C

where

E

C

C'(m )] = ea+ b(m
0

m )
0

denotes the expectation of researchers as of period 1.

Equating (a.6) to (a.8), discarding higher order terms, and using (a.7)

ae (a.9)

t (7;,

e ,

a) - m

0

?;a o BP +_o______
. a PL
BP(a _o_
a)
m

m

0

=
a

m

O

Be

o m

0

0

BP

ao 2

m

0

- b
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in period 1 to maximize expected net social

a

The Patent Office chooses

benefits, given that it knows the parameters of the model and
o

2

e

, but not

e .

and

1;

2
CJ

I;

and

Assuming an interior maximum and that the

second order conditions are satisfied, expected consumer and producer
surplus is maximized at
(a.10)

+

EG[(l

=
EG

where

-r;)(l

EG[(l

+

e, a) - m0 ] ]
* - m )]
- + b(t(I';, e , a)
+ e)a
0
- L/B)B[e

f(t(r;,

denotes the expectation of the Patent Office as of period 1.

Since, in the non-stochastic case, equilibrium by definition occurs at
(a.11)

m

0

Be= a

Substituting (a.9) in (a.10) using (a.11) and eliminating higher-order
terms,

- ao)

BP(a

(a.12)

m

0

=

aL/B

-

b

fB

a Be
0
[--

a

0

m

m

0

2

BP

-

a

b]

+ oPL
m

0

0

Substituting (a.12) in (a. 9) using (a.11) a..nd (a.5)

(a.13)

t (l;'

e '

a ) - m

0

=

z; -

e

aL/B
b - fB

The expected cost of the patent distortion is reduced by the same
fraction

a

as the expected value of the patent.

So the expected social

gain from using the patent incentive rather than a direct allocation of
m

0

units to research is, using (a.7):
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(a.14)
Substitu ting (a.13) in (a.14), using (.a.5), and taking a secondorder approxim ation,

(mo)lf[ ·. t + o; l L~
02

(a.15)

= m0 C'

1/n

(L/B) 2

4

where

C'(m) =
0

a

n

=

1

1/n - h(MP)
]
- 2(1/n + 1 - h(P))

!

2(1/n - h(MP)]

from (a.l), and

supply of inventiv e effort at

(a.16)

1 - h(P~

- L/B

n

J

is defined as the elastici ty of

m

0

a

bm

0

and

h(MP)

is defined as the elastici ty of margina l probabi lity of

success

fm

(a.17)

0
h(MP) = - -

e
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